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Optimizing Qui Tam Litigation and 
Minimizing Fraud and Abuse:  
A Comment on Christopher Alexion’s 
Open the Door, Not the Floodgates 
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost* 
Fraud is one of the most serious problems infecting our 
nation’s health care system. The National Health Care Anti-
Fraud Association estimates that 3% of health care spending is 
lost to health care fraud—$68 billion in 2007.1 The FBI cites 
estimates that health care fraud accounts for 3%–10% of the 
nation’s health care bill.2 During 2010, the Medicare fee-for-
service program had an estimated payment error rate of 10.1%, 
while the estimated error rate for the Medicare Advantage 
managed care program was 14.1% (although not all erroneous 
payments are attributable to fraud).3 While private insurers and 
self-insured employers are subject to fraudulent and abusive 
billing, just like government programs, fraud against government 
programs is particularly troublesome because the cost of fraud is 
borne by taxpayers. Widely publicized fraud against Medicare 
and Medicaid also undermines public support for these vital 
programs.  
But fraud against government programs also presents an 
opportunity. One of the most contentious issues in the current 
debate over the federal budget deficit is how to cut health care 
                                                                                                     
 * Robert L. Willett Family Professor, Washington and Lee University 
School of Law. 
 1. National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, The Problem of Health 
Care Fraud, http://www.nhcaa.org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?webcode=anti_ 
fraud_resource_centr&wpscode=TheProblemOfHCFraud#2 (last visited Jan. 28, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Financial Crimes Report to the Public, 
Fiscal Year 2008, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/fcs_report2008 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 3. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGH-RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE 186 
(2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11278.pdf.  
420 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 419 (2012) 
spending. Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP) made up 21% of the federal budget in 
2010.4 Health care expenditures are also one of the largest 
expenditures in state budgets.5  
Cutting health care expenditures is always difficult. The cost 
of health care, like the cost of anything else, is a function of the 
volume of items and services purchased and the price of each 
item or service. When a public program tries to restrict the 
volume of items and services purchased, however, it is met with 
cries of “rationing.” When a program tries to reduce prices, or 
even to reduce the rate of growth in prices, it is met with stiff 
resistance from professionals, providers, and suppliers whose 
income and profit are threatened by cost control.6 
Everyone, however, supports eliminating health care fraud 
(even if there is not always consensus as to which billing 
practices are fraudulent).7 If we can just eliminate program 
fraud, we can cut program spending without anyone having to 
suffer pain. Eliminating fraud has thus become the silver bullet 
needed to achieve health care spending reduction. 
One of the primary weapons in the federal government’s 
health care fraud armamentarium is the civil False Claims Act 
(FCA).8 The FCA allows courts to impose damages of three times 
the amount falsely claimed plus up to $11,000 per claim against 
providers who file false claims for compensation with the federal 
government or who make false statements to the federal 
                                                                                                     
 4. Ctr. on Budget and Pol’y Priorities, Policy Basics: Where do our Federal 
Tax Dollars Go? (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view 
&id=1258 (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 5. See VERNON K. SMITH, HOPING FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY, PREPARING FOR 
HEALTH REFORM: A LOOK AT MEDICAID SPENDING, COVERAGE AND POLICY TRENDS 
11 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8105.pdf (providing 
data regarding state expenditures). 
 6. The classic discussion of this is Robert G. Evans, Tension, Compression 
and Shear: Directions, Stresses, and Outcomes of Health Care Cost Control, 15 J. 
HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 101 (1990).  
 7. See Timothy S. Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A 
Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 
239, 242 (1999) (examining pushback by providers against fraud and abuse 
enforcement). 
 8. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West 2011) (providing for liability for false 
claims).  
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government in order to be paid.9 The sheer magnitude of 
potential FCA damages, which can amount to millions of dollars 
per provider, often results in substantial settlements in favor of 
the federal government and provides a significant deterrence 
against fraud.10 
A key feature of the FCA is its qui tam provision, the focus of 
Christopher Alexion’s Note.11 The qui tam provision allows a 
person with special knowledge of a fraud to sue on behalf of the 
government and to keep part of the recovery.12 This is true 
whether or not the qui tam plaintiff, or relator, is an innocent 
observer of the fraud or an active participant. Indeed, Congress 
intentionally intended to encourage “a rogue to catch a rogue”13 
when it adopted the FCA during the Civil War to combat wartime 
procurement fraud. 
The qui tam provisions of the statute, however, raise a 
central problem: When does a qui tam claimant provide 
sufficiently valuable information that the claimant should be 
granted a share of the recovery (which, as has been noted, can be 
very substantial)? On the one hand, a person should not be able 
to bring a qui tam action based on information read in the 
morning newspaper. On the other hand, a person with special 
inside knowledge should be allowed to bring a qui tam action 
even though the federal government already had some 
information about a fraud that was being perpetrated as long as 
the relator in fact provides useful information not previously 
available.  
                                                                                                     
 9. Id. 
 10. Between 1987 and 2008, federal false claims settlements and 
judgments amounted to $21.6 billion. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fraud Statistics, 
Overview, Oct. 1, 1986–September 30, 2008 (Sept. 30, 2008), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/fraud-statistics1986-2008.htm 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Fraud Statistics] (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 11. See Christopher Alexion, Note, Open the Door, Not the Floodgates: 
Controlling Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 69 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 365, 378 (2012) (discussing the “original source” exception to the FCA’s 
“public disclosure” bar). 
 12. See 29 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006) (providing for civil actions for false claims). 
 13. U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Emps. Club, 105 F.3d 675, 679 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 955–56 (1863)). 
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The question of where to draw the line is the topic of Mr. 
Alexion’s excellent Note. It is, as Mr. Alexion notes, a question 
that Congress has had a difficult time answering. Congress has 
fluctuated between, on the one hand, defining qui tam relator 
standing broadly to encourage qui tam actions and, on the other 
hand, defining it narrowly to discourage parasitic suits.14 The 
courts have tried to apply the test established by Congress but 
have reached mixed results.15 In the Affordable Care Act (ACA),16 
Congress has once again tried to answer the question of when an 
individual has standing to bring a qui tam action.17 The answer is 
not yet wholly clear, and further court decisions will be needed to 
sort it out. 
Christopher Alexion’s Note is a model law review Note. It is 
clear and concise, adequately but not excessively referenced. It is 
about law—not philosophy or economics or social theory. It 
addresses a quintessentially legal issue—the standing of a relator 
to bring a qui tam action. It analyzes judicial opinions that have 
tried to interpret the prior language of the FCA and then 
considers how courts should interpret Congress’s most recent 
amendments to the FCA.18  
Mr. Alexion’s Note is also very timely. The courts will soon 
begin applying the amendments to the FCA.19 They will have to 
discern what relevance, if any, decisions in their circuits applying 
the prior law have to application of the new law. It is even 
possible that eventually the Supreme Court will have to decide 
what the new law requires. Mr. Alexion’s Note serves as a 
                                                                                                     
 14. See Alexion, supra note 11, text accompanying notes 34–89 (discussing 
the history of the FCA). 
 15. See id., text accompanying notes 90–203 (discussing the circuit split 
resulting from the 1986 amendments). 
 16. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010) [hereinafter ACA] (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the U.S.C. (2010)) (providing for reforms to the U.S. health care 
system). 
 17. See id. § 10104(j)(2) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)) 
(amending the definition of “original source”). 
 18. See Alexion, supra note 11, text accompanying notes 204–59 (discussing 
the future of the FCA). 
 19. Although the ACA is already in effect, the qui tam provisions do not 
apply retroactively. See Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. 
ex rel. Wilson, 130 Sup. Ct. 1396, 1400 at n.1 (2011) (“The legislation makes no 
mention of retroactivity . . . .”). 
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roadmap for the courts to follow. I expect that it will be often 
cited by courts attempting to sort this out. They will, no doubt, be 
grateful to find a law review article that in fact addresses a 
practical legal problem and that offers them valuable assistance 
in their work. 
I will not attempt in this Comment to retread in any detail 
the ground covered by Mr. Alexion’s paper. The basic question it 
addresses is when a qui tam relator is an “original source” of 
information concerning fraud such that the relator can proceed 
even though information about the fraud has been publicly 
disclosed. The Note discusses the history of this provision, 
detailing a series of amendments that have tried either to 
encourage legitimate claims by broadening standing or to 
discourage parasitic litigation by narrowing standing.20 The most 
recent amendments to this provision prior to the ACA, adopted in 
1986, tried to strike a balance by prohibiting actions based upon 
public disclosure of allegations or transactions in certain contexts 
unless the relator was “an original source of the information.”21 
As Mr. Alexion notes, this standard has confused the courts, 
with some holding permissively that the relator need merely 
disclose information to the government before filing suit, others 
holding more restrictively that the relator must have been the 
source that provided information to an entity that had publicly 
disclosed the information, and yet a third group of courts 
adopting an intermediate position that the relator must have 
disclosed information to the government before the information 
was otherwise publicly disclosed.22 
As part of the ACA, Congress amended the FCA once again 
to redefine “original source” as follows: 
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an 
individual who either (i) prior to a public disclosure under 
subsection (e)(4)(a), has voluntarily disclosed to the 
Government the information on which allegations or 
transactions in a claim are based, or (ii) who has knowledge 
that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly 
disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has voluntarily 
                                                                                                     
 20. See Alexion, supra note 11, at 371–79 (providing the background of the 
public disclosure bar and its original source provision). 
 21. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3130(e)(4) (West 2011). 
 22. Alexion, supra note 11, at 379–95. 
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provided the information to the Government before filing an 
action under this section.23 
The first prong of this test would seem to adopt the 
“intermediate” approach taken by courts applying the prior law. 
Mr. Alexion contends, relying on data regarding qui tam 
litigation and on legislative history, that the second prong of the 
test should be interpreted restrictively so that only relators who 
provide information that “substantially assists” the government 
should be allowed to proceed once information regarding an 
allegation or transaction has been publicly disclosed.24 
This strikes me as a reasonable approach, discouraging on 
the one hand parasitic litigation, while on the other encouraging 
individuals who have genuinely useful information to step 
forward, even after some information about fraud is already 
known.  
While I do not intend to criticize Mr. Alexion’s proposal, I 
would like to offer two comments to give his Note more context.  
My first comment is addressed to the question of incentives to 
bring a qui tam action. While restricting standing to bring a qui 
tam lawsuit discourages parasitic lawsuits, it also discourages 
opportunistic lawsuits; thus one relevant question is whether 
opportunistic lawsuits are likely. 
Superficially, the incentives to bring opportunistic qui tam 
lawsuits would seem to be great. A qui tam relator is entitled to 
15% to 25% of the total recovery, and up to 30% if the government 
does not intervene.25 Because of the treble-damage and penalty 
provisions of the FCA, potential qui tam recoveries can amount to 
millions of dollars, and in many cases they do.26 The relator can 
                                                                                                     
 23. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4) (West 2011), as amended by ACA § 10104(j)(2) 
(emphasis added). 
 24. Alexion, supra note 11, at 398–406. 
 25. 31 U.S.C.A.  § 3730(d) (West 2011). 
 26. Awards of a million dollars or more are not uncommon. See Aaron S. 
Kesselheim, David M. Studdert & Michellle M. Mello, Whistle-Blowers’ 
Experience in Fraud Litigation Against Pharmaceutical Companies, 362 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1832, 1834 (2010) (noting that, in the authors’ study, “13 [relators] 
received between $1 million and $5 million, and 7 [relators] received more than 
$5 million”). What may have been the largest award was a $96 million award to 
a qui tam relator in a case against GlaxoSmithKline. See Gordon Gibb, Time to 
Cap Qui Tam Whistleblower Awards? (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.lawyersand 
settlements.com/articles/qui-tam-whistleblower-government-fraud/qui-tam-whis 
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recover a bounty even though the relator participated in the 
fraud, although the court can reduce the recovery under these 
circumstances and the relator can recover nothing if he or she is 
criminally convicted.27 Additionally, qui tam relators can recover 
attorneys’ fees, so any recoveries they receive need not be shared 
with attorneys (although contingent-fee arrangements are in fact 
possible).28 
The complaint has often been raised that the FCA 
encourages opportunistic litigation, a complaint that Mr. Alexion 
in part endorses.29 Although the payoff for being a qui tam relator 
can be high, the costs are very high as well. Although the statute 
prohibits employers from taking retaliatory actions against a qui 
tam relator,30 the courts have interpreted this protection quite 
conservatively, and, as a practical matter, an employee who is 
suing his or her employer is in an untenable position that cannot 
last long.31 Qui tam actions are therefore often brought by former 
                                                                                                     
tleblower-lawsuit-government-29-16036.html (noting award in GlaxoSmithKline 
case) (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). One consideration that must be kept in mind is that when there are 
multiple qui tam relators in a single case, the qui tam share is divided among 
the successful relators.  
 27. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d) (West 2011). 
 28. Id.; see also ALICE GOSFIELD, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE 
539 (2011 ed.) (noting the availability of contingency-fee arrangements). 
 29. See, e.g., Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with 
Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. 
MICH. J. L. REF. 281 (2007) (discussing FCA over-enforcement by “zealous 
‘private attorneys general’”); Michael Rich, Prosecutorial Indiscretion: 
Encouraging the Department of Justice to Rein in Out of Control Qui Tam 
Litigation Under the Civil False Claims Act, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2008) 
(arguing for joint and several liability for attorneys’ fees under FCA litigation 
and proposing that courts require certification of novel legal theories in qui tam 
litigation); Alexion, supra note 11, at 40 (quoting Christina Orsini Broderick, 
Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 949, 975 (2007)). 
 30. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(h) (West 2011). 
 31. See GOSFIELD, supra note 28, at 541–43 (citing cases interpreting  
whistleblower-protection provisions); Kesselheim et al., supra note 26, at 1836 
(“The experience of being involved in troubling corporate behavior and a qui tam 
case had substantial and long-lasting effects for nearly all of the insiders . . . .”); 
see also TOM DEVINE, THE WHISTLEBLOWER’S SURVIVAL GUIDE: COURAGE WITHOUT 
MARTYRDOM 133 (1997) (noting that “there is no comprehensive law that 
prohibits employers in the private sector from retaliating against 
whistleblowers”). 
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employees, but any individual who brings a qui tam action is 
unlikely to find future employment in the health care industry.32 
Qui tam relators may also face hostility from colleagues and co-
workers, who may well view the relator as a traitor, as well as 
efforts by their employers or former employers to humiliate and 
discredit them.33  If the relator in any way participated in the 
fraud, the relator must proceed with great caution, as it is always 
possible that the government will indict the relator criminally, 
and a criminal conviction not only subjects the relator to a 
possible fine or jail time but also disqualifies the relator from 
receiving any part of the recovery.34 
Although qui tam complaints are supposed to be unsealed 
within sixty days of filing, the government routinely requests an 
extension, and it can often take a year or more before a qui tam 
action becomes public.35 Prior to that time, the relator is in the 
very uncomfortable position of not knowing who knows or 
suspects what information regarding the relator.  After the 
complaint is unsealed, it can take months or even years before 
the case is resolved through settlement or court judgment. In the 
interim, the relator receives nothing from the case and may be 
unable to find employment.36 
As Mr. Alexion notes, the government declines to intervene 
in most qui tam cases.37 If this happens, the defendant often 
redoubles its efforts to get the case dismissed. The relator and his 
                                                                                                     
 32. See Myron Glazer, Ten Whistleblowers and How They Fared, 13 THE 
HASTINGS REP. 33, 33 (1983) (noting the “degradation ceremonies” some 
whistleblowers face); Kesselheim et al., supra note 26, at 1836 (noting that “only 
2 of the 22 insiders remained employed in the pharmaceutical industry”). 
 33. See DEVINE, supra note 31, at 27–40 (describing classic responses to 
whistleblowing); Kesselheim et al., supra note 26, at 1838–39 (noting examples 
of retaliation that was “more subtle than overt harassment”). 
 34. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d) (West 2011). 
 35. On average, cases remain under seal for thirteen months. Letter from 
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Senator 
Grassley (Jan. 24, 2011), at 14, available at www.taf.org/DOJ-HHS-joint-letter-
to-Grassley.pdf. 
 36. See Kesselheim et al., supra note 26, at 1836 (noting frustration that 
“the wheels move really slow” and describing “years spent waiting in a state of 
uncertainty”). 
 37. See Letter to Senator Grassley, supra note 35, at 15 (noting that the 
Department of Justice intervened in 22.2% of cases between 2006 and 2011 to 
date of letter). 
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or her attorney must proceed without assistance from the 
government.38 The court may interpret the government’s refusal 
to intervene as an assessment that the case has little merit, a 
judgment that may be accurate in many cases. Few cases in 
which the government declines intervention result in substantial 
recoveries.39 
If a case succeeds in a settlement or judgment, the court 
must then decide the share of the recovery that the relator can 
claim. At this point, the government, which has actively solicited 
the help of the relator, often turns on the relator, minimizing the 
contribution of the relator to the case so as to minimize the 
amount of the relator’s reward.40 Having won the case against the 
defrauder, the relator must now win a second case against the 
government. The relator generally receives the award long after 
the initial complaint was filed and long after the relator’s life was 
otherwise ruined by the qui tam action.41 Many qui tam relators 
believe that the ultimate recovery is small compared to the 
disruption and damage to their lives and the time they spent on 
the litigation.42 
In sum, although the qui tam statute offers significant 
incentives for relators to bring actions, there are also huge 
disincentives to doing so, which will in all likelihood cause most 
whistleblowers to bring qui tam lawsuits only as a last resort. It 
may be that the floodgates are not as much of a threat as is 
commonly believed. While an original-source rule may be needed 
to discourage parasitic litigation (the primary claim made by Mr. 
Alexion), it is less clear that it is needed to discourage 
opportunistic litigation. 
My second comment is intended to put the amendment to the 
FCA that Mr. Alexion addresses in the broader context of the 
ACA. The ACA represents one of the most ambitious attempts by 
                                                                                                     
 38. GOSFIELD, supra note 28, at 534 (“If the government declines 
intervention, the entire cost of litigating rests on the plaintiff . . . .”). 
 39. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fraud Statistics, supra note 10. 
 40. See GOSFIELD, supra note 28, at 538 (noting that the government 
usually argues for “the minimum relator’s share”). 
 41. See Kesselheim et al., supra note 26, at 1836 (noting financial 
difficulties and personal problems). 
 42. See id. (noting one relator’s lament that he “should have taken the 
bribe”). 
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Congress to date to deal with health care fraud and abuse. An 
entire title of the legislation adds new laws and amends old ones 
to combat program fraud and abuse.43 These can only be 
summarized here. 
First, the amendment to the definition of “original source” 
analyzed by Mr. Alexion is only one of several amendments that 
the ACA makes to the FCA. Section 1313 of the ACA not only 
redefines who can be a qui tam relator but also amends the 
provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) to allow the government to 
oppose dismissal of a case based on the public disclosure bar 
(which was arguably true under the prior law) and removes state 
and federal court litigation to which the government was not a 
party from the list of public disclosures that bar qui tam 
litigation.44 Another amendment to the FCA requires that an 
overpayment must be returned to the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), a state, or a contractor no later than 
sixty days from the date on which it is identified or the date a 
corresponding cost report is due, whichever is later.45 The reason 
for the overpayment must be explained in writing. Any 
overpayment retained after the date for reporting and returning 
is an obligation for purposes of the civil FCA, and thus retention 
can amount to a false claim.46 Section 1313 further extends the 
coverage of the FCA to private health plans that will be 
participating in the new Health Insurance Exchanges. It 
provides: 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Payments made by, through, or in 
connection with an Exchange are subject to the False Claims 
Act (31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq.) if those payments include any 
Federal funds. Compliance with the requirements of this Act 
concerning eligibility for a health insurance issuer to 
participate in the Exchange shall be a material condition of an 
issuer’s entitlement to receive payments, including payments 
                                                                                                     
 43. ACA tit. VI (providing for transparency and program integrity). 
 44. Id. § 10104(j)(2); GOSFIELD, supra note 28, at 528 (discussing state court 
actions); Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 
130 Sup. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2011) (holding that, under prior law, the public 
disclosure bar applied to information disclosed in state and local as well as 
federal administrative proceedings). 
 45. Soc. Sec. Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7k(d)(3) (West 2011), added by ACA 
§ 6402(a).  
 46. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West 2011). 
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of premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions, through 
the Exchange.47 
This provision results in a dramatic extension of the coverage of 
the FCA and will open the door to individual enrollees or persons 
with inside knowledge of private health plan fraud becoming qui 
tam relators. 
Section 6402 of the ACA amends the bribe and kickback 
law48 to provide that a claim that includes items or services 
provided because of a bribe or kickback is a false claim under the 
civil FCA.49 This resolves a question that has long troubled the 
courts and commentators. Some courts have held that a FCA case 
can be brought for a violation of the bribe and kickback statute 
while others have rejected this claim.50 The ACA further amends 
the bribe and kickback statute to provide that a person need not 
have specific knowledge of the prohibition or specific intent to 
violate it to be found guilty, resolving another question on which 
the courts had disagreed.51 
The ACA also amends other fraud and abuse laws not 
directly relevant to the FCA’s provisions. It amends the Stark 
Self-Referral Act,52 which prohibits physicians from ordering or 
referring patients for certain health care services when the 
physician receives remuneration for the referral, by prohibiting 
Medicare payments for new physician-owned hospitals and 
imposing new requirements on existing physician-owned 
hospitals.53 The law also directs HHS to establish a self-
disclosure protocol to allow providers to potentially reduce their 
liability for violations of the Stark law when they promptly 
                                                                                                     
 47. ACA § 1313(a)(6). 
 48. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b) (West 2011) (providing for criminal 
liability for accepting bribes for medical referrals). 
 49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(g) (West 2011), added by ACA § 6402(f)(1).  
 50. See BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 1069–70 (6th ed. 2008) 
(providing examples of conflicting decisions regarding the bribe and kickback 
statute). 
 51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(h) (West 2011), added by ACA § 6402(f)(2); 
GOSFIELD, supra note 28, at 194–209 (discussing the intent requirements of the 
anti-kickback statute). 
 52. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395nn (West 2011) (providing limitations on certain 
physician referrals).  
 53. ACA § 6001. 
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disclose their own violations of the law of which they become 
aware.54  
The ACA does not just penalize fraud but also takes 
important new steps to prevent it. Section 6401 requires HHS to 
establish a screening program for providers and suppliers who 
participate in Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP.55 The level of 
screening applied to different providers will be determined by 
HHS based on the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse presented by 
the providers but must include a check on licensure, a criminal 
background check, fingerprinting, unscheduled and unannounced 
site visits, database checks, and other screening as HHS 
determines appropriate.56 Providers who apply for or are 
revalidated for enrollment in Medicare, Medicaid, or CHIP must 
disclose any current or previous affiliation with a provider or 
supplier that has uncollected debt, has been subject to a payment 
suspension, or has been excluded from participation in Medicare, 
Medicaid, or CHIP, or had billing privileges denied or revoked.57  
HHS can also impose a temporary moratorium on the enrollment 
of new providers or suppliers, or of new categories of providers or 
suppliers, if HHS determines it is necessary to combat fraud, 
waste, or abuse.58 Finally, the ACA authorizes HHS to require 
compliance programs of particular categories of providers and 
suppliers as a condition of enrollment.59 
A number of new requirements are imposed by the ACA on 
physicians who order items and services under Medicare, 
particularly durable medical equipment (DME) and home health 
services. Section 6405 requires that DME, home health services, 
and other services as specified by HHS be ordered by a physician 
enrolled in the Medicare program.60 Section 6407 amends various 
sections of the Medicare and Medicaid statutes to require a face-
to-face encounter (including through telehealth) between a 
                                                                                                     
 54. Id. § 6409. 
 55. See id. § 6401 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(j), 1396a(a), and 
1397gg(e)(1)). 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.  
 60. See id. § 6405 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395m(a)(11)(B), 1395(a)(2), and 
1395n(a)(2)). 
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physician or other practitioner and a patient within a reasonable 
time frame before certification for home health services, DME, 
and other items or services as required by HHS.61 The ACA also 
includes extensive provisions to combat fraud and abuse in 
nursing homes and elder abuse.62 
The ACA extends the authority of HHS to exclude providers 
from Medicare and Medicaid and to impose civil money penalties 
on providers to combat fraud. The ACA provides for a permissive 
exclusion of providers for knowingly making false statements, 
omissions, or misrepresentations of a material fact in any 
application, agreement, bid, or contract to participate as a 
provider or enroll as a provider of services under a federal health 
care program.63  It further amends the law to provide for a civil 
money penalty for an individual or entity who orders or 
prescribes an item or service while excluded from a federal health 
care program; who knowingly making false statements, 
omissions, or misrepresentations of a material fact in any 
application, agreement, bid, or contract to participate as a 
provider or enroll as a provider of services under a federal health 
care program; or who knows of an overpayment but does not 
report and return it.64  The penalty for false statements and 
misrepresentations will amount to $50,000 for each false 
statement or misrepresentation of a material fact, plus not more 
than three times the amount improperly claimed.65 Finally, the 
ACA strengthens the health care fraud criminal law by 
enhancing the penalties for criminal fraud under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and adding to the list of health care 
offenses.66  
In sum, amendments to the civil FCA are just one part of a 
comprehensive strategy for addressing fraud found in the ACA. 
Virtually all of the attention that the ACA has received has 
focused on its health insurance reforms. But the ACA goes much 
                                                                                                     
 61. See id. § 6407 (amending Soc. Sec. Act § 1814(a)(2)(C), 1384(a)(11)(B), 
and 1835(a)(2)(A)). 
 62. See id. §§ 6701–03 (providing provisions to promote elder justice). 
 63. See id. § 6402(d)(1) (creating 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(16)). 
 64. See id. § 6402(d)(2) (creating 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(8)(9) & (10)).  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. § 10606. 
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further in reforming our health care system. In addition to 
providing a valuable roadmap for the courts for the interpretation 
of the original source amendment, Mr. Alexion’s Note also serves 
a useful purpose in illuminating another aspect of this landmark 
health care system reform effort.  
